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Abstract. We extend the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation
in which the ”cake” is divided among families. Each piece of cake is
owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical
example of such a cake is land. We examine three ways to assess the
fairness of such a division, based on the classic no-envy criterion: (a)
Average envy-freeness means that for each family, the average value of
its share (averaged over all family members) is weakly larger than the
average value of any other share; (b) Unanimous envy-freeness means
that in each family, each member values the family’s share weakly more
than any other share; (c) Democratic envy-freeness means that in each
family, at least half the members value the family’s share weakly more
than any other share. We study each of these definitions from both an
existential and a computational perspective.
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1 Introduction
Fair division of land and other resources among agents with different preferences
has been an important issue since Biblical times. Today it is an active area of
research in the interface of computer science [29,26] and economics [25]. Its
applications range from politics [8,7] to multi-agent systems [11].
In most fair division problems, the goods are divided to individual agents,
and the fairness of a division is assessed based on the valuation of each agent. A
common fairness criterion is envy-freeness: a division is called envy-free if each
agent values his own share at least as much as any other share.
However, in real life, goods are often owned and used by groups. As an
example, consider a land-estate inherited by k families, or a nature reserve that
should be divided among k states. The land should be divided to k pieces, one
piece per group. Each group’s share is then used by all members of the group
together. The land-plot allotted to a family is inhabited by the entire family.
The share of the nature-reserve alloted to a state becomes a national park open
to all citizens of that state. In economic terms, the alloted piece becomes a ”club
good” [10]. The happiness of each group member depends on his/her valuation
of the entire share of the group. But, in each group there are different people
with different valuations. The same division can be considered envy-free by some
family members and not envy-free by other members of the same family. How,
then, should the fairness of the division be assessed?
One option that comes to mind is to aggregate the valuations in each family
to a single family valuation (also known as: collective welfare function). Following
the utilitarian tradition [4], the family-valuation can be defined as the sum or
(equivalently) the arithmetic average of the valuations of all family members.
We call a division average-envy-free if, for each family, the average valuation
of the family’s share (averaged over all family members) is weakly larger than
the average valuation of any share allocated to another family. This definition
makes sense in situations in which the numeric values of the agents’ valuations
are meaningful and they are all measured in the same units, e.g. in dollars
(see chapter 3 of [25] for some real-life examples of such situations). In such
cases, it may be possible to transfer value between members of a group after the
division is done. Members who are more satisfied with the division can somehow
compensate the less satisfied members, such that finally each member enjoys the
average value.
A second option is to require that no member of any family feels any envy. We
call a division unanimous-envy-free if every agent values his family’s share at
least as much as the share of any other family. The advantage of this definition
is that it does not depend on the units in which the valuation functions are mea-
sured. It is applicable even when the valuations are only abstract representations
of ordinal preferences.
A disadvantage of unanimous-envy-freeness is that it may be difficult to
attain in practice, especially when the ”families” are large. As citizens in demo-
cratic states, we know that it is next to impossible to attain unanimity on even
the most trivial issue. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect that all citizens agree
that a certain division is envy-free. We call a division democratic-envy-free
if at least half the citizens in each family value their family’s share at least as
much as the share of any other family. This definition makes sense when land is
divided between states with a democratic regime. After a division is proposed,
each state conducts a referendum in which each citizen approves the division if
he/she feels that the division is envy-free. The division is implemented only if,
in every state, at least half of its members approve it.
Of the three definitions presented above, unanimous-envy-free is clearly the
strongest: it implies both average-envy-free and democratic-envy-free. The other
two definitions do not imply each other, as shown below.
1.1 Example
Alice 6 3 0 0
Bob 5 4 0 0
Charlie 1 8 0 0
David 0 0 6 3
Eva 0 0 6 3
Frankie 0 0 0 9
Consider a land-estate consisting of four districts. It has to
be divided between two families: (1) Alice+Bob+Charlie
and (2) David+Eva+Frankie. The valuation of each mem-
ber to each district is shown in the table to the right.
If the two leftmost districts are given to family 1 and
the two rightmost districts are given to family 2, then the
division is unanimous-envy-free, since each member of each
family feels that his family’s share is better than the other
family’s share. It is also, of course, average-envy-free and
democratic-envy-free.
If only the single leftmost district is given to family 1 and the other three
districts are given to family 2, then the division is still democratic-envy-free, since
Alice and Bob feel that their family received a better share than the other family.
However, Charlie does not feel that way, so the division is not unanimous-envy-
free. Moreover, the division is not average-envy-free since the average valuation
of family 1 in its own share is (6+5+1)/3=4, while the average valuation of
family 1 in the other share is (3+4+8)/3=5.
If the three leftmost districts are given to family 1 and only the rightmost
district is given to family 2, then the division is average-envy-free, since the
average valuation of family 2 in its share is (3+3+9)/3=5 while its average
valuation in the other share is (6+6+0)/3=4. However, it is not unanimous-
envy-free and not even democratic-envy-free, since David and Eva feel that the
share given to the other family is more valuable. ⊓⊔
Two challenges arise once the fairness criterion is selected. First, determine
whether there always exists a division satisfying this criterion. In case the answer
is yes, determine whether there exists a protocol for achieving such a division.
Cake-cutting protocols are traditionally characterized by two factors: the num-
ber of connectivity components in the final division, and the number of queries
required to achieve the division. We now briefly explain each of these factors, as
they are relevant to our results.
1.2 Number of connectivity components
Ideally, we would like to allocate to each family a single, connected piece. This
requirement is especially meaningful when the divided resource is land, since a
contiguous piece of land is much easier to use than a collection of disconnected
patches. However, a division with connected pieces is not always possible.
In fact, many countries have a disconnected territory. A striking example is
the India-Bangladesh border. According to Wikipedia,1 “Within the main body
of Bangladesh were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in turn contained 21
Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-counter-
enclave... within the Indian mainland were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves, containing
3 Indian counter-enclaves”. Another example is Baarle-Hertog - a Belgian mu-
nicipality made of 24 separate parcels of land, most of which are exclaves in the
Netherlands.2
In case a division with connected pieces is not possible, it is desirable to
minimize the number of connectivity components (hence: components) in the
division. Minimizing the number of components is a common requirement in the
cake-cutting literature. It is common to assume that the cake is a 1-dimensional
interval. In this case, the components are sub-intervals and their number is one
1 Wikipedia page “India–Bangladesh enclaves”.
2 Wikipedia page “Baarle-Hertog”. Many other examples are listed in Wikipedia page
“List of enclaves and exclaves”. We are grateful to Ian Turton for the references.
plus the number of cuts. Hence, the number of components is minimized by
minimizing the number of cuts [28,37,32,2,3].
In a realistic, 3-dimensional world, the additional dimensions can be used
to connect the components, e.g, by bridges or tunnels. Still, it is desirable to
minimize the number of components in the original division in order to reduce
the number of required bridges/tunnels.
The goal of minimizing the number of components is also pursued in real-life
politics. Going back to India and Bangladesh, after many years of negotiations
they finally started to exchange most of their enclaves during the years 2015-
2016. This is expected to reduce the number of components from 200 to a more
reasonable number.
1.3 Number of queries
The most common model for cake-cutting protocols is the query model, formally
defined by Robertson and Webb [29]. Intuitively, a cake-cutting protocol uses
two types of queries: a mark query (also called cut query) asks an agent “where
would you cut the cake such that the value of the resulting piece is X?” and an
eval query asks an agent “how much is piece Y worth for you?”.
This model has been used to prove results about the query complexity of cake-
cutting protocols, e.g. [18,17]. Interestingly, some cake-cutting problems cannot
be solved with a finite number of queries. For example, with 3 or more agents,
an envy-free division cannot be attained by a finite protocol when the pieces
must be connected [34].
1.4 Results
Our results regarding the three fairness definitions are summarized in the fol-
lowing theorems. In all theorems, k ≥ 2 is the number of families and n is the
total number of agents in all families. In the impossibility results, it is implicitly
assumed that at least one family contains at least 2 members (which implies
n > k).3
A property of cake partitions is called feasible if for every k families and n
agents there exists an allocation satisfying this property. Otherwise, the property
is called infeasible.
Theorem 1. (average-envy-freeness)
(a) average-envy-freeness with connected pieces is feasible.
(b) average-envy-freeness, with either connected or disconnected pieces, can-
not be found by a finite protocol.
Theorem 2. (unanimous-envy-freeness)
(a) unanimous-envy-freeness with connected pieces is infeasible. Moreover, at
least n components might be required for a unanimous-envy-free division.
3 Without this assumption, the problem is equivalent to cake-cutting among individ-
uals.
(b) unanimous-envy-freeness with disconnected pieces is feasible. Moreover,
the number of required components is at most 1 + (k − 1)(n− 1) = O(nk).
(c) A unanimous-envy-free division cannot be found by a finite protocol.
Theorem 3. (democratic-envy-freeness)
(a) When k ≥ 3, democratic-envy-freeness with connected pieces is infeasi-
ble. Moreover, at least n · k/2−1k−1 = Ω(n) components might be required for a
democratic-envy-free division.
(b) democratic-envy-freeness with disconnected pieces is always feasible. More-
over, the number of required components is at most 1 + (k − 1)(n/2− 1).
(c) When there are k = 2 families, democratic-envy-freeness with connected
pieces is feasible. Moreover, there is a finite protocol for finding a democratic-
envy-free division using at most n queries.
The results are summarized in the table below. For k = 2, the results are
tight: by all fairness definitions, we know that a fair division exists with the
smallest possible number of connectivity components. For k > 2, the results are
not tight. As an illustration of the currently unsolved gaps, the table includes
numeric values for k = 3 and k = 4.
Envy-freeness #Families (k)
#Connectivity Components Finite
Lower bound Existence Procedure
Average (Sec.3) Any k k (connected; optimal) No
2 n n (optimal) No
Unanimous 3 n 2n− 1 No
(Sec. 4) 4 n 3n− 2 No
Any n (k − 1) · (n− 1) + 1 No
2 2 2 (connected; optimal) Yes
Democratic 3 n/4 n− 1 ?
(Sec. 5) 4 n/3 3n/2− 2 ?
Any n · k/2−1k−1 (k − 1) · (n/2− 1) + 1 ?
2 Model and Notation
The cake to be divided is C. As in many cake-cutting papers, C is assumed to
be the unit interval [0, 1].
The total number of agents in all families is n.
Every agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} has a personal value function Vi, defined on the
Borel subsets of C. The Vi are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to
the length measure (or simply continuous). This implies that all singular points
have a value of 0 to all agents (a property often termed non-atomicity).
Additionally, the value functions are assumed to be additive - the value of a
union of two disjoint pieces is the sum of the values of the pieces.
The continuity and additivity assumptions are common to most cake-cutting
papers. 4
The number of families is k. The families are called Fj , j ∈ {1, ..., k}. The
number of members in family Fj is nj . Each agent is a member of exactly one
family, so n =
∑k
j=1 nj .
An allocation is a vector of k pieces, X = (X1, . . . , Xk), one piece per family,
such that the Xi are pairwise-disjoint and ∪iXi = C.
Ideally, we would like that each piece be connected (i.e, an interval). If this
is not possible, then each piece should be a finite union of intervals, where the
total number of components (intervals) should be as small as possible.
In the division procedures presented here, it is assumed that all agents act
according to their true value functions and not strategically. Designing cake-
cutting mechanisms that take agents’ strategies into account is a challenging
task even for individual agents [9] and we leave it to future work.
3 Average fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We assume that the value functions of the
agents are additive, and define the following family-valuations:
Wj(Xj) =
∑
i∈Fj
Vi(Xj)
nj
for j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
A division is called average-envy-free if ∀j, j′ :Wj(Xj) ≥Wj(Xj′ ).
3.1 Existence
Lemma 1. Given any n additive value functions Vi, i = 1, ..., n and any group-
ing of the agents to k families, there exists an average-envy-free division in which
each family receives a connected piece (the total number of components is k).
Proof. Given any n additive value functions Vi, the k family-valuations Wj de-
fined above are also additive. Hence, the classic cake-cutting results are applica-
ble: each of the k families in our problem can be treated as an individual agent
in the classic solution. For example, Simmons’ protocol [36] implies the existence
of an average-envy-free division in which each family receives a connected piece.
3.2 Non-existence of finite protocols
While the existence results from classic cake-cutting are applicable in our setting,
their query complexity is not preserved. The simplest cake-cutting protocol -
cut-and-choose - finds a connected envy-free division between two individuals
using only two queries (one cuts, the other chooses). However, with two families
instead of two individuals, any finite number of queries might be insufficient,
regardless of the number of components.
4 A third common assumption is that the valuations are normalized such that for every
agent i: Vi(C) = 1. The results of the present paper do not rely on this assumption.
Lemma 2. For k ≥ 2 families, if at least one family contains at least 2 members,
then an average-envy-free division (with connected or disconnected pieces) cannot
be found by a finite protocol.
Proof. We prove that the lemma is true even in the simplest case in which there
are two families. Suppose one family, e.g. F1, has two members: F1 = {1, 2},
so their family valuation is: W1 = (V1 + V2)/2. Also suppose that the valuation
of each member of F2 is W1, so that their family valuation is W2 ≡ W1. For
convenience, assume here that the agents’ valuations are normalized such that
the value of the entire cake is 1. Finding an average-envy-free division now
amounts to finding a piece X ⊆ C such that W1(X) = W2(X) = 1/2. This is
equivalent to finding a piece X ⊆ C such that V1(X) + V2(X) = 1. Hence, our
lemma reduces to the following lemma:
Lemma 3. There is no finite protocol that, given two agents with value measures
V1 and V2 satisfying V1(C) = V2(C) = 1, always finds a piece X ⊆ C such that
V1(X) + V2(X) = 1.
Proof. Define an average piece as a piece X ⊆ C such that: V1(X)+V2(X) = 1.
We now prove that finding an average piece might require an infinite number of
queries.
Each eval or mark query involves two points in [0, 1]: in an eval query, both
points are determined by the protocol; in a mark query, one point is replied by
the agent. Call these points the “known points” and include the endpoints 0 and
1 in the set of known points. Let Pm be the set of known points before step m.
Initially P1 = {0, 1}. Each query potentially increases Pm by at most two points.
For example, after a mark(0.1, v) query with a reply of 0.2, Pm = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 1}.
The protocol can be conceptually divided into steps, such that in each step, one
point is added to Pm. Hence, for every m ≥ 1, |Pm| = m+ 1.
If the protocol returns a result at step m, this result must be a collection of
intervals whose endpoints are in Pm, since the values of subsets with different
endpoints are not known to the protocol. Let Im be the set of m intervals whose
endpoints are nearby points in Pm. If the protocol returns at step m, the result
must be a subset of Im. Let Vm = {V1(X) + V2(X)|X ⊆ Im}. I.e, Vm is the set
of all values of pieces that can be returned by the protocol at step m. Note that
Vm is finite and |Vm| ≤ 2
m. The protocol can return an average piece at step m,
if and only if 1 ∈ Vm. We now prove that this cannot be guaranteed in a finite
protocol.
The proof is by induction on m. For m = 1, Vm = {0, 2} so 1 /∈ Vm. V1 is
illustrated by the dots:
bc
0 1
bc
2
Suppose the claim is true for m. Then Vm is a set of values that does not contain
1, e.g:
bc
0
bc bc bc bc bc bc
1
bc
2
At step m, the protocol adds to Pm a new point q, such that Pm+1 = Pm ∪ {q}.
This replaces an interval in Im with two smaller intervals, e.g. if q ∈ [p, r] and
[p, r] ∈ Im, then Im+1 = Im\{[p, r]}∪{[p, q], [q, r]}. Let vp := V1([p, q])+V2([p, q])
and vr := V1([q, r]) + V2([q, r]). Then:
Vm+1 ⊂ Vm ∪ {v − vp|v ∈ Vm} ∪ {v + vp|v ∈ Vm} ∪ {v − vr|v ∈ Vm} ∪ {v + vr|v ∈ Vm}
I.e, the new possible values are the previous possible values, plus or minus the
values of the new intervals (since the new intervals can be added or subtracted
from any piece).
Suppose step m is a mark query sent to agent 1. This means that the pro-
tocol can control the values V1([p, q]), V1([q, r]). It cannot, however, control the
values V2([p, q]), V2([q, r]) since the query can be sent to only one agent at a
time. Similarly, if the query is sent to agent 2 then the protocol can control
V2([p, q]), V2([q, r]) but not V1([p, q]), V1([q, r]). In both cases, the protocol can-
not control vp, vr. This means that for every protocol, there can be value mea-
sures such that the new values added to Vm do not include 1, so 1 /∈ Vm+1:
bc
0
bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc bc
1
bc
2
To conclude: after any finite number m of steps, the set of possible piece values
Vm is finite, and an adversary can select the value measures such that it does
not contain 1. Hence finding an average piece cannot be guaranteed.
Note: A similar idea was used by [29] to prove that it is impossible to find an
exact division with a finite number of queries.
4 Unanimous fairness
This section proves Theorem 2. A division is called unanimous-envy-free if:
∀j, j′ = 1, ..., k : ∀i ∈ Fj : Vi(Xj) ≥ Vi(Xj′)
We denote by UnanimousEnvyFree(n, k) the problem of finding a unanimous-
envy-free division when there are n agents grouped in k families. We relate this
problem to the classic cake-cutting problem of finding an exact division:
Definition 1. Exact(N,K) is the following problem. Given N agents and an
integer K, find a division of the cake to K pieces, such that each of the N agents
assigns exactly the same value to all pieces:
∀j, j′ = 1, ...,K : ∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(Xj) = Vi(Xj′).
Alon [1] proved that for every N and K, Exact(N,K) has a solution with at
most N(K−1)+1 components. He also showed that this number is the smallest
that can be guaranteed. We now use these results in our setting. To this end, we
show a two-way reduction between the problem of unanimous-envy-free division
and the problem of exact division.
Lemma 4 (Exact =⇒ UnanimousEnvyFree). For each n, k, a solution to
Exact (n−1, k) implies a solution to UnanimousEnvyFree (n, k) for any grouping
of the n agents to k families.
Proof. Suppose we are given an instance of UnanimousEnvyFree(n, k), i.e, n
agents in k families. Select n− 1 agents arbitrarily. Use Exact(n− 1, k) to find a
partition of the cake to k pieces, such that each of the n− 1 agents is indifferent
between these k pieces. Ask the n-th agent to choose his favorite piece. Give
that piece to the family of the n-th agent. Give the other k− 1 pieces arbitrarily
to the remaining k − 1 families. The division is unanimous-envy-free.
Combining this lemma with the result of [1] immediately implies the following
upper bound on the number of required components:
Corollary 1. Given n agents in k families, there exists a unanimous-envy-free
division with at most (k − 1) · (n− 1) + 1 components.
Lemma 5 (UnanimousEnvyFree =⇒ Exact). For each N,K, a solution to
UnanimousEnvyFree (N(K − 1) + 1, K) implies a solution to Exact (N,K).
Proof. Given an instance of Exact(N,K) (N agents and a number K of required
pieces), create K families. In each of the first K − 1 families, put a copy of each
of the N agents. In the K-th family, put a single agent whose value measure is
the average of the given N value measures:
V ∗ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vi.
The total number of agents in all K families is N(K − 1) + 1. Use Unani-
mousEnvyFree (N(K−1)+1, K) to find a unanimous-envy-free division, X. By
the pigeonhole principle, for each agent i in family j: Vi(Xj) ≥ 1/K.
By construction, each of the first K−1 families has a copy of agent i. Hence,
all N agents values each of the first K − 1 pieces as at least 1/K and:
∀i = 1, ..., N :
K−1∑
j=1
Vi(Xj) ≥
K − 1
K
.
Hence, by additivity, every agent values the K-th piece as at most 1/K:
∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(XK) ≤ 1/K.
The piece XK is given to the agent with value measure V
∗, so again by the
pigeonhole principle: V ∗(XK) ≥ 1/K. By construction, V
∗(XK) is the average
of the Vi(XK). Hence, necessarily:
∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(XK) = 1/K.
Again by additivity:
∀i = 1, ..., N :
K−1∑
j=1
Vi(Xj) =
K − 1
K
.
Hence, necessarily:
∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀j = 1, ...,K − 1 : Vi(Xj) = 1/K.
So we have found an exact division and solved Exact(N,K) as required.
[1] proved that for every N and K, an Exact(N,K) division might require
at least N(K − 1)+1 components. Combining this result with the above lemma
implies the following negative result:
Corollary 2. For every N,K, let n = N(K − 1) + 1. A unanimous-envy-free
division for n agents in K families might require at least n components.
This corollary implies that, in particular, unanimous-envy-freeness with con-
nected pieces is infeasible. This impossibility result is generalized in Lemma 6.
4.1 Infinite procedures and approximations
It is impossible to solve Exact(N,K) by a finite protocol whenever N ≥ 2 and
K ≥ 2 [29, pp. 103-104]. By Lemma 5, this implies:
Corollary 3. UnanimousEnvyFree cannot be solved by a finite protocol when-
ever n > k.5
However, there is an approximation procedure that converges to an exact
division of a cake to k = 2 pieces [33]. By Lemma 4, this procedure can be used
to find an approximate unanimous-envy-free division for two families.
5 Democratic fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 3. A division X is called democratic-envy-
free if for all j, j′ = 1, ..., k, for at least half the members i ∈ Fj :
Vi(Xj) ≥ Vi(Xj′ )
5 Because N(K − 1) + 1 > K iff (N − 1)(K − 1) > 0 iff N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2.
5.1 Existence and number of components
Given a specific allocation of cake to families, define a positive agent as an agent
that values his family’s share as more than 0. Note that this is a much weaker
requirement than proportionality. Define a zero agent as a non-positive agent.
Lemma 6. Assume there are n = mk agents, divided into k families with m
members in each family. To guarantee that at least q members in each family are
positive, the total number of components might have to be at least:
k ·
kq −m
k − 1
Proof. Number the families by j = 0, ..., k − 1 and the members in each family
by i = 0, ...,m − 1. Assume that the cake is the 1-dimensional interval [0,mk].
In each family j, each member i wants only the following interval: (ik + j, ik +
j + 1). Thus there is no overlap between desired pieces of different members.
The table below illustrates the construction for k = 2, m = 3. The families are
{Alice,Bob,Charlie} and {David,Eva,Frankie}:
Alice 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bob 0 0 1 0 0 0
Charlie 0 0 0 0 1 0
David 0 1 0 0 0 0
Eva 0 0 0 1 0 0
Frankie 0 0 0 0 0 1
Suppose the piece Xj (the piece given to family j) is made of l ≥ 1 com-
ponents. We can make l members of Fj positive using l intervals of positive
length inside their desired areas. However, if q > l, we also have to make the
remaining q − l members positive. For this, we have to extend q − l intervals to
length k. Each such extension totally covers the desired area of one member in
each of the other families. Overall, each family creates q − l zero members in
each of the other families. The number of zero members in each family is thus
(k − 1)(q − l). Adding the q members which must be positive in each family, we
get the following necessary condition: (k − 1)(q − l) + q ≤ m. This is equivalent
to:
l ≥
kq −m
k − 1
.
The total number of components is k · l, which is at least the expression stated
in the Lemma. ⊓⊔
In a unanimous-envy-free division, all members in each family must be pos-
itive. Taking q = m gives l ≥ m and the number of components is at least
km = n, which is the bound of Corollary 2. In a democratic-envy-free division,
at least half the members in each family must be positive. Taking q = m/2 gives:
Corollary 4. In a democratic-envy-free division with n agents grouped into k
families, the number of components might have to be at least
n ·
k/2− 1
k − 1
.
Note that when k = 2, the lower bound of Corollary 4 is 0. Indeed, for two
families there always exist democratic-envy-free divisions with connected pieces.
This is proved in the next subsection.
5.2 Division procedure
Algorithm 1 describes a procedure that achieves a democratic-envy-free division
for two families. For each family, a location Mj is calculated such that, if the
cake is cut atMj, half the members value the interval [0,Mj] as at least 1/2 and
the other half value the interval [Mj, 1] as at least 1/2. Then, the cake is cut
between the two family medians, and each family receives the piece containing
its own median. By construction, at least half the members in each family value
their family’s share as at least 1/2, so the division is democratic-envy-free.
The division has only 2 components (each family receives a connected piece).
In contrast to the impossibility results of the previous sections, this protocol is
finite. In fact, it requires only n mark queries (one query per agent).
Algorithm 1 Finding a democratic-envy-free division for two families
INPUT:
- A cake, which is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1].
- n agents, all of whom value the cake as 1.
- A grouping of the agents to 2 families, F1, F2.
OUTPUT:
A democratic-envy-free division of the cake to 2 pieces.
ALGORITHM:
- Each agent i = 1, ..., n marks an xi ∈ [0, 1] such that Vi([0, xi]) = Vi([xi, 1]) = 1/2.
- For each family j = 1, 2, find the median of its members’ marks: Mj = mediani∈Fjxi.
Find the median of the family medians: M∗ = (M1 +M2)/2.
- If M1 < M2 then give [0,M
∗] to F1 and [M
∗, 1] to F2.
Otherwise give [0,M∗] to F2 and [M
∗, 1] to F1.
The above procedure does not work for more than 2 families. Currently,
all we have is the following existence result, which is a trivial outcome of the
existence results of Section 4. Apply these results with n/2 instead of n: select
half of the members in each family arbitrarily, then find a division which is
unanimous-envy-free for them while ignoring all other members. Hence:
Corollary 5. Given n agents in k families, there exists a democratic-envy-free
division with at most (k − 1) · (n/2− 1) + 1 components.
It is an interesting open question whether a democratic-envy-free division for 3
or more families (with disconnected pieces) can be found by a finite protocol.
6 Alternatives
Instead of envy-freeness, it is possible to use proportionality as the basic fairness
criterion. Proportionality means that, when there are k families, each family
receives at least 1/k of its total cake value. Then, average-proportionality
means that the average value of each family in its allocated share (averaged
over all family members) is at least 1/k of the average value of the entire cake;
unanimous-proportionality means that every agent values its family’s share
as at least 1/k of the total; democratic-proportionality is defined analo-
gously. When the valuations are additive, envy-freeness implies proportionality;
when there are only two families, proportionality implies envy-freeness. Theorem
1 (Section 3) holds as-is for average-proportionality. In Theorems 2 and 3, the
number of components in the positive results can be improved from O(nk) to
O(n log k), using a recursive halving technique. See [31] for details.
The above criteria assume that all families have equal entitlements. This
makes sense, for example, when k siblings inherit their parents’ estate. While
an heir will probably like to take his family’s preferences into account when
selecting a share, each heir is entitled to exactly 1/k of the estate regardless of the
size of his/her family. In general, each family may have a different entitlement.
The entitlement of a family may depend on its size but may also depend on
other factors. For example, when two states jointly discover a new island, they
will probably want to divide the island between them in proportion to their
investments and not in proportion their population. This generalized problem
can be solved by applying results in cake-cutting with unequal entitlements. In
particular, Stromquist and Woodall [35] prove that, for every fraction r ∈ [0, 1],
it is possible to cut a piece of cake made of at most n intervals, which each agent
values as exactly r of the total cake value. This result can be used to generalize
our theorems to families with different entitlements. See [31] for details.
One could consider the following alternative fairness criterion: an allocation
is individually-proportional if the allocation X = (X1, . . . , Xk) admits a refine-
ment Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where for each family Fj , ∪i∈FjYi = Xj , such that for
each agent i, Vi(Yi) ≥ 1/n. Individually-proportional allocations always exist
and can be found by using any classic proportional cake-cutting procedure on
the individual agents, disregarding their families. The number of components is
at most n. Individual-proportionality makes sense if, after the land is divided
among the families, each family intends to further divide its share among its
members. However, often this is not the case. When an inherited land-estate
is divided between two families, the members of each family intend to live and
use their entire share together, rather than dividing it among them. Therefore,
the happiness of each family member depends on the entire value of his family’s
share, rather than on the value of a potential private share he would get in a
hypothetic sub-division.
7 Related Work
There are numerous papers about fair division in general and fair cake-cutting
in particular. We mentioned some of them in the introduction. Here we survey
some work that is more closely related to family-based fairness.
7.1 Group-envy-freeness and on-the-fly coalitions
[5,20] study the concept of group-envy-free cake-cutting. Their model is the stan-
dard cake-cutting model in which the cake is divided among individuals (and
not among families as in our model). They define a group-envy-free division as
a division in which no coalition of individuals can take the pieces allocated to
another coalition with the same number of individuals and re-divide the pieces
among its members such that all members are weakly better-off. Coalitions are
also studied by [12,13].
In our setting, the families are pre-determined and the agents do not form
coalitions on-the-fly. In an alternative model, in which agents are allowed to form
coalitions based on their preferences, the family-cake-cutting problem becomes
easier. For instance, it is easy to achieve a unanimous-proportional division with
connected pieces between two coalitions: ask each agent to mark its median line,
find the median of all medians, then divide the agents to two coalitions according
to whether their median line is to the left or to the right of the median-of-
medians.
7.2 Fair division with public goods
In our setting, the piece given to each family is considered a ”public good”
in this specific family. The existence of fair allocations of homogeneous goods
when some of the goods are public has been studied e.g. by [14,15,16,19]. In
these studies, each good is either private (consumed by a single agent) or public
(consumed by all agents). In the present paper, each piece of land is consumed
by all agents in a single family - a situation not captured by existing public-good
models.
7.3 Family preferences in matching markets
Besides land division, family preferences are important in matching markets,
too. For example, when matching doctors to hospitals, usually a husband and
a wife want to be matched to the same hospital. This issue poses a substantial
challenge to stable-matching mechanisms [21,22,23].
7.4 Fairness in group decisions
The notion of fairness between groups has been studied empirically in the context
of the well-known ultimatum game. In the standard version of this game, an
individual agent (the proposer) suggests a division of a sum of money to another
individual (the responder), which can either approve or reject it. In the group
version, either the proposer or the responder or both are groups of agents. The
groups have to decide together what division to propose and whether to accept
a proposed division.
Experiments by [27,6] show that, in general, groups tend to act more ratio-
nally by proposing and accepting divisions which are less fair. [24] studies the
effect of different group decision rules while [30] uses a threshold decision rule
which is a generalized version of our majority rule (an allocation is accepted if
at least M agents in the responder group vote to accept it).
These studies are only tangentially relevant to the present paper, since they
deal with a much simpler division problem in which the divided good is homo-
geneous (money) rather than heterogeneous (cake/land).
8 Conclusions
One practical conclusion that can be drawn from our results concerns the se-
lection of fairness criterion. When n (the total number of agents) is sufficiently
small, it is reasonable to use unanimous-fairness, which guarantees that all agents
are satisfied with their family’s share. However, when n is large, as is the case
when dividing land between states, insisting on unanimous-fairness might result
in each country having an absurdly fractioned territory. In this case, democratic-
fairness is a more reasonable choice. This is particularly true when there are only
two states, since in this case democratic-fairness can be achieved with connected
pieces and in finite time, which is impossible with the other fairness criteria.
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